Originally posted on: https://www.employmentlit.com/2023/06/29/jury-to-decide-new-jersey-employees-disability-discrimination-and-retaliation-claims/
By: Ty Hyderally, Esq., Francine Foner, Esq., and Adela Barbura
Recently, in Craytor v. CTOS, LLC, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94358, 2023 WL 3735883 (D.N.J. May 30, 2023), the New Jersey District Court denied a trucking company’s attempts to dismiss a former employee’s disability discrimination and retaliation claims. Plaintiff, Sherwood Craytor (“Craytor”), worked as an equipment driver for Defendant, CTOS, LLC (“CTOS”). Craytor alleged that CTOS discriminated against him after he was injured on the job and terminated him in retaliation for his taking medical leave and filing workers’ compensation claims.
In addition to meeting his burden of establishing a prime facie case, the District Court found that Craytor provided sufficient evidence demonstrating an issue of material fact regarding pretext, requiring that the case be heard by a jury. Therefore, the District Court denied CTOS’s motion for summary judgment to dismiss Craytor’s claims for disability discrimination and retaliation under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”) and for retaliation under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act (“NJWCA”).
If a plaintiff cannot provide direct evidence of discrimination, they may proceed with circumstantial evidence via the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). First, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing all elements of a prima facie case of disability discrimination that creates “a presumption [ ] that the employer unlawfully discriminated against [him].” Craytor at *8, citing Clowes v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 538 A.2d 794, 805 (N.J. 1988). Then, the burden shifts to the employer to set forth a “legitimate, non-discriminatory” reason for terminating the plaintiff. Craytor at *8. If the employer provides a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the termination, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove the employer’s reason was “merely pretext for the discrimination.” Id. at *8, citing Gerety v. Alt. City Hilton Casino Resort, 184 N.J. 391, 877 A.2d 1233, 1237 (N.J. 2005).
To determine if Craytor had satisfied his burden of establishing a prima facie case, the Court explained that he must demonstrate that “(1) he was disabled within the meaning of the NJLAD; (2) he was performing his work at a level that met Defendant’s legitimate expectations; (3) he was nevertheless terminated; and (4) Defendant had sought another to perform the same work after he was terminated.” Craytor at *9, citing A.D.P. v. ExxoMobil Research and Engineering Co., 428 N.J. Super. 518, 54 A.3d 813, 821 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). While CTOS did not dispute that Craytor satisfied the first three elements of his prima facie case, it disputed that he had met the fourth element. CTOS argued that it did not seek someone else to perform Craytor’s job after his termination and therefore Plaintiff had failed to satisfy the fourth factor of his prima facie case. However, the District Court noted that when an employee is laid off due to reductions in force, the prima facie standard is “relaxed.” Craytor at *10, citing Marzano v. Computer Sci. Corp. Inc., 91 F.3d 497, 503 (3d Cir. 1996). Therefore, it is sufficient if the plaintiff can “show that he was discharged, while the [employer] retained someone [outside the protected class].” Id. at *10-11. Here, CTOS retained two employees similarly situated to Craytor who were neither disabled nor perceived to be disabled. Id. at *8, citing N.J.A.C. § 13:13-1.3 (noting that even employees perceived to have a disability are protected by the NJAD). Therefore, the Court held that Craytor satisfied his prima facie burden and denied CTOS’s summary judgment motion.
Because Craytor established a prima facie case, the burden then shifted to CTOS to show that it had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Craytor’s termination. Craytor argued that it had retained two other non-disabled drivers because they did “extra things.” However, the District Court rejected that assertion, as Craytor was able to show that such “extra things” were not part of his job description and were not communicated to him. Additionally, the District Court found that a reasonable jury could infer pretext from the fact CTOS terminated Craytor who had no disciplinary history, but retained Kevin Ryan (“Ryan”), another driver who was not disabled, even though Ryan was less senior than Craytor and had a disciplinary history. The Court also rejected CTOS’s contention that reductions in demand, customer cancellations, and other interruptions from COVID-19 led them to terminate Craytor. Rather, the Court agreed that CTOS’s claim of work reduction was contradicted by Craytor’s supervisor asking him to return to work quickly because work was busy.
Under the NJWCA it is unlawful for an employer “to discharge or in any manner discriminate against an employee as to his employment because such employee has claimed or attempted to claim workmen’s compensation from such employer.” Craytor at *15, citing N.J.S.A § 34:15-39.1. The analysis for retaliatory discharge under the NJWCA is also analyzed via the McDonnel Douglas framework. Id. at *15, citing Morris v. Siemens Components, 928 F. Supp. 486, 493 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317, 1318 (N.J. 1981)). To succeed on a retaliatory discharge claim under the NJWCA, Plaintiff must establish that “(1) he made or attempted to make a claim for workers’ compensation benefits; and (2) he was discharged for making that claim as a result.” Id. at *16, citing Morris, 928 F. Supp. at 493. In this case, the question to be resolved was whether Craytor provided sufficient evidence to “establish a causal connection between his workers’ compensation claims and his termination.” Craytor at *16. The District Court noted that CTOS’s termination of Craytor while he was on leave and receiving workers’ compensation benefits, in conjunction with CTOS’s retainment of the other non-disabled drivers, might sway a reasonable jury to find that there was a causal connection between Craytor’s workers’ compensation claims and his termination.
This decision is a win for New Jersey employees facing disability and retaliatory discrimination under the NJLAD and NJWCA.
